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Make or break? 
Concerning the value of redundancy as a creative strategy 
 
 
There is a contradiction at the heart of digital art making, regarding its temporal 
mediality and relationship with a mainstream visual arts practice that values 
permanence. Why do we wish to preserve something temporal and fleeting? Will the 
preservation of digital works contribute to a process of commodification that many 
media artists have sought to avoid by embracing the ephemeral nature of digital 
media? Are there reasons that would justify preserving digital works of art when, for 
some artists, redundancy is a key principle in their practice? 
 
A cultural determinacy? 
 
Art is generally valued according to a set of established criteria that include 
authenticity, originality, craft skill, uniqueness, rarity, provenance and its state of 
preservation. Modernist artists, as early as Dada but more often since, have sought 
to question or overturn these criteria and establish alternate value systems, where 
mass production, appropriation, temporality, decay and transience are fore-
grounded. Established artists, as diverse as Tristan Tzara, Kurt Schwitters, Andy 
Warhol, Judy Chicago, Donald Judd, Robert Smithson, Joseph Beuys, Carolee 
Schneeman and  Nam June Paik have, through various strategies of production, 
contextualisation and mediation, proffered alternate models of artistic value. 
 
Smithson's Spiral Jetty stands as an emblematic work in this regard - unownable, 
more or less impossible to preserve, being subject to the vagaries of its environment, 
produced emploing heavy earth moving equipment and regularly transformed 
through natural weathering and chemical processes, perhaps the only conventional 
criteria of value such a work sustains is its singularity and thus rarity value. Spiral 
Jetty stands as one of the iconic post-war American art works, a touchstone for 
generations of artists since, probably because it breaches so many of the established 
values we conventionally associate with art objects. 
 
The digital arts share many characteristics with work like Smithson's. The digital and 
media arts have their roots in 1970's post-modern culture - the first generation of 
media artists, including Robert Breer (recently deceased), Pauline Oliveros, Stan van 
der Beek, the Whitney's, Paik and many others, often members of Fluxus, emerged 
during the 1960's and were central to an artistic culture that would prove influential 
beyond its domain, feeding into conventional visual art practices as well as other 
disciplines, such as music, literature and performance, and facilitating the emergence 
of novel art forms. These artists focused on process and action, not craft and the final 
artifact. They were, admittedly, often obsessive in their use of materials, but they 
generally avoided fetishistic strategies, often choosing the abject and quotidian over 
the rare and rarified. Many of these artists used materials that, by their nature, could 
not be preserved. Their rationale for such choices were not just aesthetic but often 
socio-economic. 
 
A second generation of digital artists can trace their origins to this same cultural 
milieu. Larry Cuba, Jeffrey Shaw, Roy Ascott and others have produced works that 
employ media platforms that are by their nature unstable and unfixed, focusing value 
on transience and momentary experience. For these artists the attraction of digital 
media was not just the potential of such systems and tools, or how these systems 
allowed reflection upon what was rapidly becoming a mediatised culture, but also the 
innately fleeting character of the art works and experiences that could be produced. 
Their artistic rationale was to circumvent the traditional values of the visual arts and, 
especially, the art market. This was, in many cases, a political imperative. 
 
Today we have a fourth generation of digital arts practitioners, in an established 
domain in the creative arts with a 50 year history. At risk of generalising, this 
generation of artists is arguably more pragmatic than their forebears. However, it is 
the case that much digital arts activity remains focused on unstable media and is 
undertaken at either the margins of the mainstream visual arts world or out-with it 
altogether. Why is this? Could it be that the ideals of generations of experimental 
artists have had limited impact and the traditional values we earlier identified, as 
underpinning the commodification of art, sustain the determination of the canon? It 
seems that few collectors are willing to invest in art works that might survive for only 
a few years - or even minutes or seconds. Few private collectors are keen to get 
involved in the expense of developing novel preservation techniques for those digital 
art works that may have the potential to be conserved. The art market and thus, to a 
considerable degree, mainstream visual arts practice, is driven by private collector's 
cheque books. You have to "follow the money" to find "where the action is", and it is 
not in digital art. This was publicly affirmed, by Ekow Eshun, when he announced the 
closure of London's Institute of Contemporary Arts' Live and Media Arts department, 
citing its "lack of cultural urgency" (Gardner 2008), by which he meant mainstream 
(nee, market determined) interest. Eshun's subsequent departure from the ICA was 
possibly not unconnected with the political fallout of that decision but was mainly due 
to the parlous state of the ICA's finances. In this there is a comforting irony for artists 
engaged in the media arts. 
 
Nevertheless, the ICA aside, there are a number of public museums investing in 
developing media arts (including digital) conservation programmes. Tate, MoMA, the 
Stedlijk, SFMoMA, the Pompidou and a few others are leading on this work. A 
smaller number of specialist institutions, such as ZKM, the Daniel Langlois 
Foundation (which has today announced it is donating its entire collection to the 
Quebecois Film Council as its founder departs engagement with the sector), 
Nederlands Media Arts Institute and the BFI, are also doing important work in this 
area, as are a number of academic research programmes. The work of Jon Ippolito 
on the Variable Media Initiative, is notable, previously curator at the Guggenheim, 
responsible for media arts, and now Professor at the University of Maine (Depocas et 
al, 2003), as is that of Steve Partridge, with the Video Rewind project at Dundee 
University and Scott Rettberg at the University of Bergen with the European 
Electronic Literature Knowledge Base. This is all important work but it largely 
focuses, quite reasonably, on developing conservational techniques for works that 
the institutions involved have in their collections. By definition, most of these works 
are by artists who are part of the canon of contemporary art, if only because these 
institutions have collected their work. As we have observed, much of the activity in 
the digital arts remains at the margins, or outside, of the mainstream art world and 
very few digital works are in such collections. 
 
Most digital art work produced is never likely to be collected, privately or 
institutionally. Many of the most important works in the field will escape their clutches, 
often because, as previously noted, artists choose to employ creative strategies to 
ensure this will be the case. What will happen to this work? If it is lost then it will 
never be part of the documented history of the domain and, as we know, history 
consists of what we document. Does it matter if this work is lost? If it does matter 
then will it fall to future archeologists, those whose job it is to reveal what has been 
lost to history, to recover what they can of such works? If so, then what will they 
recover? 
 
Errki Huhtamo's and Jussi Parikka's recently released book, Media Archeology 
(Huhtamo & Parikka 2011), indicates that this is not a problem of the future but of the 
present and, even, the recent past. Many digital art works have already been lost as 
the media platforms and other dependencies they rely on are superseded by new 
operating systems, chip-sets and entirely new kinds of media. Some artists 
speculated that the internet would function as an eternal proxy preservation medium 
but many works that have network software or hardware dependencies or employ 
network protocols have been lost as the technology of the internet has evolved. Many 
net art projects are no longer accessible, often poorly documented and references to 
them might only exist in third party media. Igor Stromajer, for example, has just 
completed deleting most of his online work from his server, removing it from the 
internet (Stromajer 2011). Works such as Stromajer's would seem to present a class 
of art that now requires the attention of archeologists rather than historians. 
 
There are some who are suggesting that we are witnessing the demise of the home 
computer and the evolution of a new platform that offers an experience that, whilst 
highly interactive, does not possess the profoundly adaptable and interactive 
characteristics of a fully programmable computer. These new devices are typified by 
the smart phones, tablets and iPads that proliferate in consumer culture. Core to the 
design of these devices is the separation of reading and writing. By this, I do not 
mean conventional writing, as it is possible to undertake word processing on these 
devices - although that may involve purchasing add on hardware, such as keyboards, 
to render the writing experience tolerable. I am using the word "writing" here in the 
profound sense of being able to "write the machine" and make the medium. This is 
one understanding of what media art can be - not art that employs media but art that 
fashions media. 
 
A technological interdependency. 
 
Alan Turing's original conception of the computer was of a symbolic machine - a 
machine that exists as a symbolic description operating on those symbols according 
to the descriptions, thus operating on itself and the symbols and descriptions that 
compose it. Turing's machine is a writing machine that can write and re-write itself. In 
this sense it is a machine with inherent agency. All computers, to a greater or lesser 
extent, are instances of Turing's original vision. Some programming languages have 
been developed in order to render these symbolic ontology's explicit, as they are 
"written" (for example, Prolog). Most computer operating systems are designed to be 
highly configurable and re-programmable, either by easy to use drag and drop or 
clickable preference panes or through the re-writing of the "boot" algorithms that run 
during the start-up of the computer. These "preferences" are symbolic descriptions of 
what the computer is - its capabilities, processes, dependencies and properties. 
Within the scope of the hardware it is possible to create many different types of 
computer by manipulating these algorithms. It is also possible to automate this 
process, so that symbolic systems (for example, computer programs) are able to 
create their own descriptions of what a computer might be. Many computer viruses 
are designed to do this. 
 
Generally the more configurable a machine is, especially at a low-level approaching 
hardware dependencies, the less easy it is use, requiring, as you would expect, a 
significant knowledge of computational theory and technology. However, as 
computers have become pervasive in our society and used for a wider range of 
activities they have also become easier to use. This is, generally, a good thing, 
enhancing our productivity, experience of things and even facilitating novel forms of 
expression and experience. However, computers become progressively easier to use 
at the risk of denying the user the capability to reprogram or reconfigure the machine. 
This is the case with many consumer-oriented devices, such as consoles, smart 
phones and tablets. These machines remain computers in so far as they can run 
software, perform calculations and interact with external phenomena, like the user's 
touch. However, they are not "writing machines" in the sense of Turing's vision. It is 
true that software can be written to be used on these devices - but such software is 
not written on the device. Rather, it is written on a computer and installed on the 
client device. Thus it becomes difficult to describe a smart phone or tablet as a 
"writing machine", in the sense Turing conceived the computer, and thus equally 
difficult to consider such devices as computers. Their precise status is somewhat 
unclear. 
 
Is this a problem? It can be argued it is. As smart mobile devices replace computers, 
as current sales projections suggest they will, those who exclusively use such 
devices will be unable to "write" their own machines. On many levels this may not 
appear a significant issue. Most current computer-users do not seek to build their 
own computers or learn computer programming. However, this emerging scenario 
evokes the classic dichotomy between production and consumption, the chasm 
between user and producer. Karl Marx, and numerous other socio-economic 
thinkers, have written on what happens when people have no access to or power 
over the means of production. Ted Nelson (Nelson 1974), has argued that the 
computer is an inherently revolutionary device as it offers the user access to the 
means of production, allowing them to redefine those means by reconfiguring the 
machine itself. For such apostles of computer liberation the arrival of the smart 
device popularises the technology they helped develop whilst sounding the beginning 
of the end for their utopian vision. 
 
What has this to do the preservation of digital art? 
 
A reading and a writing. 
 
The issue here is literacy and being able to read and write; where it is important to be 
enabled to create something - a text, a machine, a world. This is what artists do. 
They are people who, through high levels of literacy, are able to create shared 
experiences, both imaginary and real, symbolic and material. To my mind interesting 
art works are those that enable the reader to participate in this process of making 
and becoming, whether by the exercise of their imagination, through the process of 
interpretation, or by materially or symbolically changing the work itself in some 
manner. In the case of digital art this interplay of reading and writing has been 
enabled at the level of the symbolic codes that describe the machine, the medium, 
that materialises the work. In these works the explicit processes of "writing" are as 
dynamic and motile as their potential "readings". 
 
It could be argued that to appreciate writing one needs to know not only how to read 
but also be a writer - if only for the quotidian task of composing an email or school 
essay. Like the book, the computer is a platform that is as good for writing as it is for 
reading, that invites a two way engagement with its potential, such that the 
reader/writer is able to intervene in and determine what that might be. What would 
our culture be like if most of us could only read and gaining access to the instruments 
for making texts was the preserve of professional "writers"? If we lose the ability to 
write we will, as non-writers, lose the ability to read, becoming illiterate. Denied the 
ability to operate in the symbolic universe our capacity to imagine alternate worlds or 
selves and, ultimately, to make ourselves, will be compromised. We would be 
"written" by, and become the property of, others. There is deep meaning in the claim 
that literacy liberates and transforms. In this context digital literacy is also 
transformational. 
 
Does it matter if many of us lose the capacity to read and write with computers? 
Arguably it does, if we accept that we live in a progressively mediatised world, a 
society where our relationships with knowledge, information, work, play and one 
another are mediated by digital systems at every level. If we wish to be active 
participants in this culture, rather than passive consumers, then we do need to retain 
literacy with the dominant media, computers. In this respect the proliferation of 
consumer smart devices is a threat to our literacy and capacity for creative 
engagement. Those who are, for whatever reason, excluded from the "digerati" will 
be confined to the role of consumers of digital culture. 
 
Sherry Turkle has observed, in her recent book Alone Together (Turkle 2010), that 
we no longer ask what we use computers for but what we do not. The computer has 
become essential not only in our practical lives but also in our social and emotional 
lives. Computer literacy is no longer just a requirement for getting the right job but for 
navigating and understanding our social relations. However, the social media that 
have enabled this would appear to be part of the same ilk of technologies as the 
consumer devices we have already been discussing. We have to ask, are social 
media part of a drift away from digital literacy or are we witnessing a new form of 
literacy emerge, an "emotional" literacy, digitally mediated, where we "write" 
ourselves into being within information space? If we are to accept Turkle's argument 
the answer to this latter question is, a not unproblematic, no. However, if we accept 
this is a new form of literacy then we can ask whether we are witnessing an 
evolutionary step in the human-machine interface, where our capacity to create has 
become both a materially and socially symbolic operation? If so, we can conceive of 
media being social in a profound sense; of media platforms enabling the making of 
social relations, cultures and people. Arguably, it is, as yet, too early to know which is 
the likely outcome, if either. 
 
Tim Ingold notes that creativity is often considered as an imposition of order by an 
agent of some kind (Ingold 2010) but has argued that we can alternatively view it as 
"an ongoing generative movement that is at once itinerant, improvisatory and 
rhythmic", weaving with and through the many agents involved - human, material and 
technological. This is a participative and inclusive comprehension of creativity and, 
although Ingold does not cite Mauss, this generous approach could be considered to 
be related to the notion of creativity as "gift", evoking creativity's key role in social 
formation. At the heart of Ingold's argument is the principle that creativity is an 
activity, not a thing, and, quoting Paul Klee, he observes that when embodied in an 
artifact the living dynamic that is creativity expires. In this vision the work of art 
appears as no more than the dead and decaying remains of what was the living 
creative activity. 
 
This returns us to the original conjecture of this text, that many media (and other 
contemporary) artists have chosen the path they have in order to maintain their focus 
on art as something you do, not something you make. Many artists have chosen to 
produce work that defies conservation and collection, existing only for as long as the 
work is in "play" amongst all those engaged in its making - the author, the reader and 
others. For many this has not been an aesthetic strategy but pursued out of a 
particular apprehension of the role of creativity in the weaving (or "writing") of society. 
Ingold uses the term "textility", with diligence, suggesting not only the archaic 
process of weaving but also the process of "writing". It is tempting here to consider 
one of the earliest examples of automation, and its role in the development of 
computing, the punch card programmable Jacquard Loom, used extensively, from 
the 19th century onwards, in the textile industries. In this machine we have "writing" 
and weaving as functions of one another and a mechanical model for how people are 
made - as necessary attendants to the machine and subjects of the Industrial 
Revolution, a metaphor for how we are "written" and "woven" as a social fabric. The 
question remains - who is being made, by whom and to what purpose? We are 
reminded why literacy is so important. 
 
The risk inherent in a strategy of artistic redundancy, where art works are made to 
decay, fail or be lost, as the systems they depend on evolve into other forms, is that 
of forgetting and subsequent illiteracy. Should we seek to preserve works of digital 
art not because we wish them, as artifacts, to participate in the socio-economic milieu 
that is the contemporary art world but because, by allowing these works to die, 
without trace, we are contributing to a cultural forgetting that may ultimately lead us 
to risk losing our capacity to "write" and thus to read. "Writing" is something we do, 
not something we make - but it is also something we read, our capacity to write being 
directly linked to our ability to read, and vice versa. If we lose the possibility of one 
we will lose the capacity for the other. If we were to treat all art in this manner, 
allowing it to decay as soon as its existence as a vital becoming is complete, then we 
would have nothing to read. This risks ignoring the generative potential in reading 
that which "remains". In this sense no art work is ever complete or dead. No matter 
how they are made, or how inert they might appear, art works remain alive and open 
to new completions. The question is how this is informed by those who are reading? 
At the same time we recognise that without forgetting, without decay and death, there 
is no new life, no new experiences and no new memories. 
 
 
Simon Biggs 
Edinburgh, October 2011 
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